Abstract-This paper shows some insecurities in Xu's forward secure multi-proxy signature scheme. There are two kinds of attacks on this scheme: (1) anyone can forge some certain messages which to be sign and cannot detect by the signature verifier. (2) This scheme can't resist the dishonest signer forgery attack by forging its own public key. After that, the paper proposed two new forward-secure multi-proxy signature schemes based on discrete logarithm problem and quadratic residues. With verifying all the signers' public keys, the improved schemes can resist lots of outsider attack and insider attack as above mentioned. The validity of the new scheme can be verified, and they are secure multi-signature schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The multi-signature scheme is a special signature scheme, which provides that multiple signers can cooperate to sign the same message. In 1983, Itakura and Nakamura first proposed this concept [1] , after that many multi-signature schemes were proposed [2, 3, 4, 5] . On many occasions, if the signer can't sign some message for some reason, then the signer can delegate his signing capability to other signer, and the proxy signers can sign on behalf of an original signer. This scheme is called proxy signature, the concept of proxy signature was first proposed by Mambo, et al in 1996 [6] . In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer is allowed to delegate his signing power to a designed person or group, who is called the proxy signer, and the proxy signer can sign messages to generate proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer. During the past years, many proxy signature schemes and various types of proxy signature schemes were proposed [7, 8] .
The multi-proxy signature was first proposed by Hwang S.J, et al. in 2000 [9] , It means there is only single original signer, who could authorize a proxy group as his proxy agent. And in such a way that only all proxy signers can cooperate with each other to generate a valid proxy signature. In 2009, Feng Cao, gives the formal definition and security model of an identity-based multiproxy signature scheme from bilinear pairings [10] . The multi-proxy signature figure as follows: Forward-secure signatures are used to defeat signature attacker in cases of the signer's private key exposure. In 1989, Günther firstly proposed the definition of "forward secrecy", which provided that the signature key evolves with time [11] . Bellare and Miner proposed a forwardsecure signature firstly, the scheme of basic idea is the use of a key-evolving signature scheme whose operation is divided into time-periods. In each time period, the signer's private key was different. [12] , after that, a lot of forward secure signature schemes [13, 14, 15] was suggested. In 2006, Xu proposed a new forward secure multi-proxy signature [16] , but this scheme is not secure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, I briefly review of Xu's scheme. In Section 3, the paper gives out the cryptanalysis on Xu's scheme. In section 4, the paper proposes a new multi-proxy signature scheme based on DLP, then gives analysis of the new scheme. In section 5, proposes a new multi-proxy signature scheme which is based on quadratic residues and gives security analysis of the new improvement. Finally, the conclusions and remarks were drawn in Section 6.
Ⅱ. BRIEF REVIEW OF XU'S SCHEME
In 2006, Xu, et al present a forward secure multi-proxy signature scheme. the scheme satisfy single original signer can delegate his/her signing capability to the proxy signers. But Xu's scheme is not secure because the attack can forge some unauthorized messages. In the followings, the brief review of Xu's scheme is given, and then attack is proposed.
Suppose there is only one original signer A, and there are L proxy signers build up a proxy signer group
. T is the numbers of time periods.
A. System Initialization Procedure (1) Let ' p , ' q be two large primes, and p is also a large prime which satisfy p=2 ' p ' q , let g be the primitive-root of the cyclic group GF(p), h() is a one-way collision resistant cryptographic hash function. Supposed the proxy signer sign the message as the order 1 the public key i y . After that, the system initialization is complete, the multi-proxy system's public key is: Y= (p,g,h,T, A y , i y
B. Proxy share generation Procedure
The original signer A delegates signing capability to the proxy signers.
(1) The original signer A chooses an integer A k ∈[1,p- 
1) randomly, computes
A K = A k g mod p, A δ = A x h( w , A K )+ A k mod (p-1x + = 2 , i j x mod (p-1).
D. Multi-proxy signature Procedure
Suppose at time period j. All the proxy signers sign the message, the paper as the sample of i B sign the message. 
Ⅲ. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF XU'S MULTI-PROXY
SIGNATURE SCHEME
There are lots of possible attacks to the signature scheme, which can be divided into outsider attack and insider attack. The outsider attack means that an attacker who is not the signature signer, but the attacker can forge some unauthorized messages. The insider attack means that single signer or some malicious signers can forge some unauthorized messages.
A. Outside attack
This paper shows that the attack can forge some unauthorized messages by forging signature parameters after the attacker knows one valid signature [ , ( , ( , ) , , ( , ))]
1) The first method of outside attack (1) The attacker randomly selects an integer ' k ∈ [1,p-1), then he/she can forge unauthorized message ' m , which satisfy h( '
So, to the Xu's scheme, if the attacker only knows single valid signature, the dangerous of this forge method is very limited. Because it is very difficult to find an unauthorized message m', which satisfy h( ' m ) = ' k .h(m), and it is almost impossible that the unauthorized message m' is meaningful. But if the attacker knows a lot of valid signatures, or g is not a large integer (g is the primitive-root of the cyclic group GF(p)), supposed the attacker collects k valid signatures, and if g doesn't satisfy g >> k, from the birthday attack, the forge method is dangerous, and the attack can forge a lot of meaningful messages.
2) The second method of outside attack
Suppose at the period of j, the proxy signer ' j (1≤ ' j <j). This paper shows that Xu's forward secure multi-proxy signature scheme doesn't satisfy the forward secure feature.
Suppose at the period of j(1<i≤L), the attacker knew the proxy signer ' x , and the attack method as follow:
(1) The attacker lets ' 
This attack method cannot detect by the signature verifier secretary. Proof because
.
R y δ mod p. So Xu's forward secure multi-proxy signature scheme doesn't satisfy the forward secure feature.
3) The third method of outside attack
In proxy share generation procedure, the original signer A delegates signing capability ( w , A K , A δ ) to all the proxy signers. If the attacker gets the proxy key ( w , A K , A δ ), he/she can joined the group proxy group and sign the message. The attack method as following ways:
(1) The attacker randomly selects an integer '
k mod (p-1), and the attacker forges '
So in this method, the attack can join the proxy signer's group and sign the message.
(2) The attacker lets h( ' w , ' 
Verify
Verify:
B. Inside attack
Insider attack means that the attacker is the signer who can forge some unauthorized messages. Supposed in period time j, attacker can replace all the proxy signers to sign the unauthorized all the messages. Suppose the attack is i B .
(1) The attacker i B is one of the prosy signers who does not generate his/her public key firstly, until all the other proxy signers finish generating their public keys. The attack selects an integer x ∈ Verify:
IV. THE IMPROVED SCHEME BASED ON THE DLP
The new scheme consists of five procedures as follows: system initialization procedure, proxy share generation procedure, evolve procedure, multi-proxy signature procedure and signature verification procedure.
T is the numbers of time periods. The new scheme adds a signature verifier v U , whose responsibility is to check the proxy signers' public keys in system initialization procedure and to check the system's signature in signature verification procedure. When the signers finish generating their public keys and their private keys, then they send to the signature verifier v U to check whether their public key is valid or not. In this way, the improved scheme can resist forge attack.
A. Mult-Proxy signature Scheme 1) System Initialization Procedure
(1) System Parameter Setup In the improved scheme, the system choose two large prime numbers, p>q and q|p -1. g is the primitive-root of the cyclic group GF(p), g∈ is invalid, it is means that i U 's public key is forgery, and the system is insecure. So the system verifier must let the signer regenerate his/her public key again, until i U 's public key is valid. If all of the signers' public keys are valid, the system initialization is complete. So with verifying all of the signers' public keys, the scheme can resist forge attack. 
2) Proxy share generation Procedure
The original signer A delegate capability to the proxy signers.
(1) For i ∈ {1, … … , L}, the original signer A randomly chooses an integer i k ∈ A s signature. Other original signers generate the proxy key as the same method; after all of the original signers' proxy keys are valid, the proxy share generation complete.
3) Evolve Procedure
The time period can be divided into {0, 1, 2,…, j, … T}. Suppose at time j + 1, the signer computes 
4) Multi-proxy signature procedure
The paper proposes the proxy signer how to sign the message, as the sample of the proxy signers i B sign the message as follows:
(1) All the proxy signers 1 2 
( ) 
If the equation holds, it means that signers sign the message correctly; else the signature verifier rejects the signature, and judges the signature invalid.
B. the New Scheme Correctness Testify
The method of computing the signers' public key 
Firstly it can compute 1 i s − as follows:
So it can draw the conclusion that 
C. Security analysis of new multi-proxy signature scheme
In the followings, this paper shows that the new improved scheme is secure because it can resist these attacks.
1) Resist outside attack
To the direct crack attack, if an attacker who is not the signer but he wants to forge a multi-signature for some messages by outsider attack. He must compute s with the
which is very difficult, because computing s is the difficulty in solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). And it is also impossible to compute the signers' Therefore, the new scheme can resist direct crack.
And the new scheme can resist the outside attack as fore mentioned. Because if the attacker wants to forge unauthorized message ' m , which must satisfy h( '
and it is very difficult to forges R', which satisfy
mod p, so it can resist outside as mentioned.
And the new forward-secure multi-proxy signature has the feature of forward secure. Suppose at the period of j, the attacker knew the proxy signer ' 
, from the theorem of the quadratic residues, the attacker can't get the value of , '
So it is very difficult to get the value of i s , and it is very difficult to forges ' i B s signature. As fore mentioned, the new scheme can resist a lot of outside attacks.
2) Resist Inside attack
Inside attack means that some multi-signatures can forge some unauthorized messages. The attacker doesn't generate his/her public key at first, while the attacker wait all the other signers publish their public keys, then the attacker forges public key according the other signers' public keys. On this method, he can replace all the signers to sign the message without authority. This paper describes how the new scheme can resist inside attack. Suppose i B is the attacker, he forges his v U s private key, so it is almost impossible to satisfy the equation. By checking all the proxy signers' public keys, the new scheme can prevent i B inside attack. So the new multi-proxy signature scheme can avoid a lot of inside attacks and outside attacks with checking all the signers' public keys.
V. THE IMPROVED SCHEME BASED ON THE QUADRATIC

RESIDUES
The new scheme consists of five procedures: system initialization procedure, proxy share generation procedure, evolve procedure, multi-proxy signature procedure and signature verification procedure. Suppose there is only one original signer A, and there are L proxy signers build up a proxy signer group B 1 -1) ). The system let e be the system's public key; d is the system's private key.
Then the system chooses g be the primitive-root of the cyclic group GF(p), g∈ * p Z . h() is a public one-way collision resistant cryptographic hash function. The multiproxy public key is ( , , , , , , 1,2, ) 
2) Proxy share generation Procedure
(1) For i ∈ {1, … … , L}, the original signer A randomly chooses an integer i k ∈ A s signature. Other original signers generate the proxy key as the same method; after all of the original signers' proxy keys are generated, the proxy share generation complete.
3) Evolve Procedure
The time period can be divided into {0, 1, 2, …. j, … T}. Suppose at time j+1, the signer computes 
4) Multi-proxy signature procedure
At time period j, the paper proposes the proxy signer how to sign the message, as the sample of the proxy signers i B sign the message as follows:
(1) All the proxy signers 1 2
B B B B
− …… choose large integers
r r r r 
U verify the signature is valid or not as follows:
If the equation holds, it means that signers sign the message correctly and the proxy-multi signature to the message m 
B. the New Scheme Correctness Testify
Computing the original signer's public key 
C. Security analysis of new multi-proxy signature scheme
1) Resist Outside attack
To the direct crack attack, if an attacker who is not the signer but he want to forge a multi-signature for some messages by outsider attack. He must compute s with the 
2) Resist Inside attack
The new forward-secure multi-proxy signature scheme can resist inside attack. Because the proxy signer's public keys and private keys are generated by the signature center (SC). So it is impossible that the proxy signer can forge his/her public key, so the new multi-proxy signature scheme can avoid inside attacks.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper shows Xu's multi-proxy signature scheme has a security flaw, then the paper design two kinds of improved multi-proxy signature schemes, which based on discrete logarithm problem and quadratic residues. Compare with other schemes, this scheme can resist a lot of outsider attacks and insider attacks. The computation cost and the size of the new schemes are identical to that of an individual signature, and the verification process of the improved schemes is almost identical to that of an individual signature.
